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1 Introduction 
 
This chapter discusses how psychological essentialism relates to dehumanization. It will 
focus on two dimensions of essentialism: entitativity and natural kind thinking, which 
include different elements of essentialism. Dehumanization as understood in this chapter 
can be cognitive and/or behavioral and can involve categorical or graded denials of hu- 
manness (see Kronfeldner, Introduction to this volume). It will be assumed (rather than 
discussed) that beliefs in a human essence can catalyze dehumanization: they can 
strengthen or even immunize the claims made about the differences among people that 
ground dehumanization. Defending such a catalyzing role of psychological essentialism is 
a rather weak and uncontroversial claim, even though it is often unclear how exactly the 
catalyzing works, and even though it is limited to certain cases (see Section 6 on that limi- 
tation). That is why the focus in this chapter is on a much stronger and more controversial 
claim – namely, the claim that essentialism is necessary for dehumanization. This chapter 
will present historical and psychological evidence that shows why such a necessity-claim 
is contestable and how it can be revised in light of that evidence. The resulting revision of 
the necessity-claim will also help in explaining how essentialism catalyzes dehumaniza- 
tion. 
 
After reviewing examples of authors who claimed a tight connection between es- 
sentialism and dehumanization (Section 2), certain assumptions will be laid out (Section 3). 
These assumptions are important to situate the analysis of whether and in which sense 
beliefs in essences are necessary for dehumanization to occur (Sections 4 and 5). 
 
 
2 Examples of connecting psychological essentialism and dehumanization 
 
Scholars differ not only with respect to the strength of the connection between essential- 
ism and dehumanization (catalyzing or necessary) but also with respect to which ele- 
ments of psychological essentialism are used, and which concept of dehumanization is 
 
1 I want to thank Nick Haslam, Fabian Krämer, Michele Luchetti, Alexander Reutlinger, Silvia Sebastiani, 
David Livingstone Smith, Somogy Varga, and two anonymous referees for feedback or recommendations. 
Thanks also to Justin Leuba, student assistant in 2019/20, for his help in the picture and reference search and 
copy editing. I would also like to acknowledge the support I received for this paper from Central European 
University as part of the Research Excellence Support Fund. 
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assumed. In his famous philosophical critique of the concept of human nature, David Hull 
(1986: 7), for instance, stressed that unfortunately many people still believe that 
 
[t]he normal state for human beings is to be white, male heterosexuals. All 
others do not participate fully in human nature. (emph. added) 
 
To dehumanize people, for Hull, is to regard some human beings as not normal (deficient) 
and as not participating fully in human nature, the alleged essence. This entails not only a 
reference to humans as a biologically delineated group (Homo sapiens), but also a reference 
to a certain kind of naturalness of the essence of this group. 
 
Gordon Allport (1954) provides a connection between dehumanization and essen- 
tialism via the more general claim that essentialism is involved in prejudices (be they de- 
humanizing or not). He claimed that humans use a “principle of least effort” when they 
build their categories regarding humans. They simplify by essentializing: 
 
To consider every member of a group as endowed with the same traits saves 
us the pains of dealing with them as individuals. One consequence of least 
effort in group categorizing is that a belief in essence develops. There is an 
inherent ‘Jewishness’ in every Jew. The ‘soul of the Oriental,’ ‘Negro blood,’ 
Hitler’s ‘Aryanism,’ ‘the peculiar genius of America,’ ‘the logical French- 
man,’ ‘the passionate Latin’—all represent a belief in essence. A mysterious 
mana (for good or ill) resides in a group, all of its members partaking 
thereof. (Allport 1954: 173; emphasis added) 
 
According to Allport, categorizing people into groups involves a belief in essence, 
which entails a belief in the homogeneity of group members with respect to shared traits, 
and a belief in the inherence of these traits. Whether Allport or Hull assumed that essen- 
tializing in the respective sense is necessary for dehumanization would require an in- 
depth textual interpretation of their work that has to wait for another occasion; and it can 
wait, since there are contemporary scholars who clearly make such strong necessity- 
claims. 
 
Jacques-Philippe Leyens and colleagues, in a paper that is widely taken as the be- 
ginning of a remarkable amount of social psychological work on dehumanization, used 
the term “infrahumanization” for the form of dehumanization they studied (graded at- 
tribution of secondary emotions), and claimed 
 
[f]or infrahumanization to occur, the members of the outgroup have to be 
considered radically different from the discriminators and to be attributed 
a different essence. (Leyens et al. 2000: 194) 
 
Given what they say in the rest of their paper, I take this to mean that an infrahumanizer 
assumes that 
 
all members of a specific group share something in common, and what they 
share makes them distinctive from members of other groups. (ibid.: 184; 
emph. added). 
 
As a consequence, infrahumanization of out-group members means “denying them one or 
several of the typically human characteristics” (ibid.). Essentializing the human category, 
in their account, boils down to a combination of attributing homogeneity to being human 
and distinctness of membership in the respective human kind. It involves building a stere- 
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otype regarding salient properties of human beings (in the case of Leyens et al., secondary 
emotions). As a result, variation within the group is discounted, which allows drawing of 
decisive group boundaries. 
 
David Livingstone Smith (2011, 2014, this volume) similarly argues that for dehu- 
manization to occur there needs to be a denial of the human essence. He writes: 
 
I do not think that it is possible to understand the dynamics of unambigu- 
ous episodes of dehumanization unless one views them through the lens of 
psychological essentialism. (Smith 2014: 821) 
 
For him, psychological essentialism involves taking an essence as an inalterable given that 
is hidden from appearances and inherent to the individuals (see, for instance, Smith 2011: 32- 
34, 275). This is an account of psychological essentialism that is closely modeled after 
standard natural kind thinking, which takes natural kinds as having essences in the speci- 
fied sense, in contrast to artificial kinds (ibid.: 95-102; cf. Smith 2020, 63-70). Smith goes so 
far to define dehumanization with reference to natural kind thinking: 
 
Dehumanization is the belief that some beings only appear human, but be- 
neath the surface, where it really counts, they aren’t human at all. (Smith 
2011: 5; emph. added) 
 
This contrast between appearance and a ‘beneath the surface’ essence will concern us in 
Section 4, in order to clarify whether belief in such ‘heavy-metal’ essences—unchangeable, 
hidden, and inherent—is necessary for dehumanization to occur. It is important that this 
involves a claim that we observe (rather than infer) humanity. Historical examples will 
help us in giving nuance to that claim.2 It should also be noted that Smith (e.g., 2014: 821) 
excludes graded forms of dehumanization from being proper forms of dehumanization. 
 
 
3 An error theory of essentializing the human category and the diversity of elements of 
essentialism 
 
In the following section, an error theory of psychological essentialism regarding the hu- 
man category will be assumed. If we essentialize what it means to fall within the human 
category, we make an error, since, scientifically viewed, there is no such essence of what it 
means to be human. Within philosophy of science, Hull (1986) is considered as the start- 
ing point for the by-now broad consensus on such an error theory of essentializing the 
human category (see Kronfeldner 2018, for review and a contemporary defense of it). This 
also means that some humans (e.g., scientists) are cognitively able to categorize humans 
without using essences. This is compatible with experimental studies, which have been 
interpreted to show that many children and some adults are unable to reach a post- 
essentialist style of reasoning (see, for a canonical summary of that body of research, Gel- 
man 2003). The respective studies thus neither show that essentializing is a necessary part 
of how humans categorize (since it applies to some adults but clearly not all since at least 
scientists have moved beyond it), nor is the essentialist interpretation of the respective 
studies uncontested. Strevens (2000), for instance, defends an alternative explanation of 
 
 
2 See also Varga, this volume, for a systematic take on how perception and dehumanization relate, independ- 
ent of the issues dealt with in this chapter and oriented toward psychological literature on mind perception; 
see Mikkola, this volume, on how this relates to the so-called ‘paradox’ of dehumanization and the notion of 
the uncanny. 
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the accumulated data, an interpretation that does not attribute essentialist thinking to the 
study participants. 
 
Worse even, there is no agreement on the definition of psychological essentialism, 
at least not if one takes into account the relevant literature across developmental psychol- 
ogy, cognitive science, social psychology, philosophy, history, and gender studies. Given 
this situation, I decided to specify and analyze the connection to dehumanization with 
respect to specific elements and dimensions of psychological essentialism rather than use 
one definition of essentialism (i.e., one combination of the elements only). We met some 
such elements already above (Section 2). Rothbart and Taylor (1992), in a paper that is 
widely acknowledged as an anchor for discussions about psychological essentialism re- 
garding social categories, mention a further element – namely, informativeness (inductive 
potential), which is well known from natural kind thinking and reminds us that 
knowledge of group membership often comes with a potpourri of information that 
grounds inductive projection (inferences about further properties of the individual). For 
instance, learning that a piece of shining stuff in one’s hand is a piece of gold is quite in- 
formative. One can reliably infer from that alone some interesting additional facts about the 
very stuff in one’s hand: the weight of it, the hardness of it, when it melts, the value of it 
on the market, and so on. 
 
With this, we have the following list of elements of essentialized thinking: 
 
• Homogeneity of group members with respect to salient properties; 
• Informativeness of group membership for inductive inferences about proper- 
ties typical of the kind; 
• Inherence of essential properties; 
• Naturalness of essential properties, either via the concept of human nature as 
referring to the biological species Homo sapiens, or via the concept of natural 
kind; 
• Inalterability of essential properties, either developmentally and/or evolution- 
arily; 
• Non-observability of essential properties; 
• Distinctness of group boundary (i.e., group boundaries and membership are 
mutually exclusive); 
• Normality of properties and members, with a reference to normativity and thus 
to deficiency. 
 
There are similar lists in the relevant literature that all differ slightly in the definition and 
number of elements.3 These differences do not matter for the purposes of this chapter. 
What does matter is that, according to Rothbart and Taylor (1992) and Haslam et al. (2000, 
2002), these elements can be aligned along two dimensions. In the following, I take it that 
only homogeneity and informativeness are necessarily part of the first dimension of es- 
sentializing social categories. This dimension is called entitativity since it gives these 
groups an entity-like coherence (an idea that goes back to Campbell 1958).4 The rest—in 
particular naturalness, inalterability, non-observability, and distinctness—belong to a sec- 
ond dimension of essentialism. It entails natural kind thinking, since it fits how 20th- 
century philosophy has characterized the latter (see Ereshefsky 2010, for review). Normal- 
ity can attach to both dimensions. Since Smith and Leyens et al., who have made explicit 
 
3 There are six in Gelman (2003), nine in Haslam et al. (2000), eight in Haslam et al. (2002), seven in Haslam 
and Levy (2006), four in Bain (2014), and five in Rhodes et al. (2017). 
4 See Phillips (draft) on different kinds of entitativity: one “dynamical“ and related to group agency only, the 
other related to similarity (as utilized in this chapter). According to Phillips, dynamical entitativity is attribut- 
ed to a group “when it is seen as an agentic coalition.” 
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claims about essentialism being necessary for dehumanization, used either natural kind 
thinking or entitativity, we will scrutinize these two kinds of essentialisms in the follow- 
ing. I will start with the more demanding natural kind thinking. 
 
 
4 Is reference to a hidden and inherent essence necessary? 
 
Smith assumes that in dehumanization a human appearance is first observed and then 
cognitively discounted. Therefore, difference with respect to humanness (dehumaniza- 
tion) is located in a hidden and inherent essence. That natural kind essences are often also 
perceived as fixed does not play such a big role in his necessity-claim; it will thus be ig- 
nored here too (see Section 5, for one specific issue regarding it).5 
 
We need an example. When the Spaniards dehumanized the Amerindians, then, 
according to Smith (2014: 815), the Spaniards literally saw that these individuals were hu- 
mans (perception of sameness), but they attributed a different essence. The story goes that 
after Columbus’ landfall in 1492, Spaniards hacked off natives’ limbs, burned them alive, 
and fed their babies to the Spaniards’ dogs, and so on. Some complained, including the 
Dominican friar Antonio de Montesinos who asked, famously, in 1511, “Are these not 
men? Have they not rational souls?” This question was not rhetorical since, in addition to 
the colonizers treating the ‘natives’ as less than human, there were scholars, such as 
Giordano Bruno or the alchemist Paracelsus, among others, who denied a shared human 
group membership of their people with those Amerindians. They did so by regarding the 
Amerindians as, for instance, homunculi—beings with a human body but no soul—which 
explains Montesinos’ question about the soul. Regarding Amerindians as beings without 
a proper soul exemplifies the sort of natural kind thinking that Smith has in mind with his 
necessity-claim: the ‘other’ was understood as human-looking but as devoid of the hidden 
and inherent property of having a (proper) soul, which was, in the ontology of the time, 
the essence of being human. (For a short review of this case and context, see Smith 2011: 
77ff; for details see, for instance, Pagden 1986, Abulafia 2008, and Kontler, this volume). 
Hence, this example confirms Smith’s claim. 
 
Yet, there are cases of dehumanization that happen in a different manner. Already, 
the colonial context of Spaniards dehumanizing Amerindians provides us with such cases. 
Sometimes, the behavioral dehumanization of Amerindians happened with reference to 
their non-Adamic origin. They were dehumanized because they were taken to not descend 
from Adam, the common denominator of the Judeo-Christian-Islamic androcentrism. This 
form of dehumanizing the Amerindians violates Smith’s claim that denial of a hidden and 
inherent essence is necessary for dehumanization. After all, a specific genealogy is not an 
inherent property; it is (if at all a property) a relational property. Such a relational dehu- 
manization, as Kronfeldner (2018) calls it, was also still in use when Charles Darwin wrote 
his On the Origin of Species, in which he developed a theory of evolution that opposed such 
polygenic accounts, and with it slavery. His theory, famously, relied on the claim of a 
common descent of all humans (and ultimately of all other living beings), thereby showing 
that a polygenic justification of slavery is already scientifically wrong. Desmond and 
Moore (2009: xiii-xix), who write about Darwin’s opposition to slavery, regard it therefore 
as historically “paradoxical” that Darwin’s theories “have been used to justify racial con- 
flict and ethnic cleansing.” 
 
 
 
5 Part of what follows in the rest of this section is based on Kronfeldner (2018: 19-23, 26, 234-237). 
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From the perspective of dehumanization studies, and in particular with respect to 
the question about how essentialism and dehumanization connect, it is simply evidence 
that dehumanization is quite persistent—so persistent that it is not eradicated by a change 
in ontology. Having every human included into one species was, at Darwin’s time, a step 
toward less dehumanization. Yet, it still allowed to regard some of the included to be less 
human – namely, in the sense of less evolved (see Kontler, and Sebastiani, this volume). 
And even nowadays evolutionary hierarchies are in use, as psychological studies about 
so-called blatant dehumanization confirm. In these studies, participants are shown the 
conventional picture of an evolutionary ascent (from ‘lower’ creatures, via apes, to hu- 
mans) and asked to position the respective out-groups. It turned out that Hungarians be- 
lieve that Roma people are less evolved, and (similarly) that North Americans believe that 
Hispanics are less evolved, to take two results as examples (see Kteily et al. 2015; see also 
Haslam, this volume). 
 
I take the available historical and psychological evidence to show that relational 
dehumanization of the sort described, where an individual or a group is regarded as less 
human simply because of a certain assumed genealogical distance to the individual (or 
group) that dehumanizes, can involve but does not require that the dehumanized ‘other’ is 
also believed to lack in inherent essence. As long as genealogy can be used to create dis- 
tance, it can be used in a dehumanizing manner. ‘The more closely related, the more hu- 
man’ would be the logic within that variant of post-essentialist relational dehumanization. 
 
Whether non-relational dehumanization necessarily involves attribution of differ- 
ences in unobservable (and in that sense hidden) essence is a slightly more difficult case, 
but it points in the same direction. I will use the history of dehumanization of women as a 
case in point that will show that we actually have to distinguish three different interpreta- 
tions of Smith’s necessity-claim if it is applied to non-relational dehumanization. 
 
Dehumanization of women, dating as far back as the beginning of Western philos- 
ophy (not to speak of other, non-Western androcentric contexts), standardly involves 
claims about women’s intellectual inferiority. Certain intellectual abilities, taken as mental 
and thus as not directly observable, are not or are less attributed to women. The decisive 
point in two of the three interpretations of the non-relational necessity-claim will be how 
these unobservable mental abilities are connected to observable physiological or behav- 
ioral differences: are they correlated with the latter or not? 
 
If the non-relational necessity-claim is interpreted as not applying to the case of de- 
humanization of women since women have never been regarded as less than human, then 
the necessity-claim becomes trivially true since it becomes true by definition. It is made to 
be true by applying a very narrow concept of dehumanization. Smith’s claim is actually 
intended that way since the dehumanization of women usually follows a graded form of 
dehumanization, which he, as mentioned, excludes from his account of dehumanization. 
Attribution of different essence and dehumanization then both boil down to nothing but 
claiming that the dehumanized belongs categorically to a different kind, utilizing the dis- 
tinctness element of essentialized thinking. But even though Smith has his reasons for 
narrowing the concept that way (see Smith, this volume), I take this narrowing to be a 
price too high to pay, given that there are so many similarities (if not intersectionalities) 
between the dehumanization of women and other kinds of dehumanization. A too narrow 
stipulated definition ignores these similarities (see Jeshion 2018 for a similar point against 
Smith’s definition of dehumanization). In addition, it trivializes natural kind thinking (the 
intended kind of psychological essentialism) since the claim can mobilize for it only one 
element – namely, the distinctness element. 
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If the necessity-claim is interpreted as claiming that dehumanization of women as 
intellectually inferior involves, necessarily, the attribution of differences in mental proper- 
ties, contrasted to observable physiological or behavioral characteristics, then the necessi- 
ty-claim is again trivially true for the respective cases, even though for different reasons. It 
is true simply because one will have difficulties finding a historical or contemporary case 
where the assumed concept of being human completely lacks reference to mental proper- 
ties. And again, it also trivializes the assumed psychological essentialism. It would in- 
volve nothing but reference to mental properties understood as not directly observable. In 
other words, this interpretation can again mobilize for its defense one element only: in 
this case, the non-observability element of essentialized thinking. What we would end up 
with, given that interpretation of the necessity-claim, is again a far cry from natural kind 
thinking as is usually constructed and as introduced by Smith. 
 
Hence, if not trivially true, the claim can only amount to the assertion that dehu- 
manization (whether graded or categorical) requires that the respective ‘other’ is taken to 
be observably the same but different in essence. I take this to be closest to what Smith intended 
with his necessity-claim (taken to also apply more broadly to cases of graded dehumani- 
zation and to ignore, for the moment, relational dehumanization). The problem with this 
version of the necessity-claim is that already Aristotle’s justification of why slaves and 
women are by nature mentally inferior violates it. For the sake of the argument, I will 
again focus on the case of women’s inferiority and take Aristotelian essentialism to be 
close to what is, above, called natural kind thinking. I thus ignore that Aristotelian essen- 
tialism is actually quite difficult to classify historically.7 I assume the following: Aristotle’s 
essentialism implied that variations in a species are deviations from a type. The essence of 
the human species consists in the human life form, which is not only the form (contrasted 
with matter) but also the end (telos) of human flourishing. The end (and, thus, function) of 
humans is to be rational. Deviations are members of the same kind who have not fully real- 
ized the form of the kind and are thus inferior. Form is norm in Aristotelian essentialism. 
 
Women were for Aristotle such inferior deviations—deviations from human na- 
ture and inferior to the free men who represented the kind (see, Aristotle, Politics, Book 1, 
1252a-1260b). Women’s inferiority is naturalistically explained with reference to observa- 
ble differences stemming from the way women are physiologically generated. These ob- 
servable differences have to do with the movements of the particles involved in embryon- 
ic development and the ancient distinction of hot versus cold matter (see Schiebinger 
[1989: 161-165] and Tuana [1993: 18-52] for how the ancient cosmology and ontology of 
four elements relates to the history of dehumanizing women). Thus, according to Aristotle, 
a concrete observable difference (lack of heat) explains why women end up being less 
developed, including less developed in terms of their intellectual capacities. 
 
In terms of elements of psychological essentialism, one can summarize the case as 
follows: the explanatory schema is essentialist in the entitativity sense, since a trait (ra- 
tionality) is picked out as group defining and informative when contrasted with other 
traits that were deemed to be negligible for what it means to be human. It is also essential- 
ist in the natural kind sense since it refers to an inherent and fixed form that can material- 
ly be realized in a more or less ideal manner. With respect to dehumanization, it follows 
that Aristotle’s dehumanization of women is a case of attributing less humanness to a par- 
ticular group in an overgeneralized and thus homogenized manner on the basis of ob- 
servable differences, which is then taken to be correlated with and explanatory for mental 
differences. This cognitive dehumanization definitely had some behavioral consequences. 
After all, in ancient Greek society, men were supposed to be the masters of women and 
 
7 See Roughley (forthc) for review of how not to interpret Aristotle; see also Winsor (2006), McOuat (2009), or 
Müller-Wille (2011) for the historically shifting contours of essentialism. 
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women had quite restricted rights. With respect to the focus of this chapter, it follows that 
Aristotelian dehumanization of women is not a case of regarding women as observably 
the same but essentially different. Women were for Aristotle already observably different 
and these differences were salient for issues of equality. That they were salient is im- 
portant since, after all, there are plenty of observable differences, some of which might not 
actually be observed or, if observed, they might not be taken as salient. 
 
Over historical time, observation of anatomical and physiological differences even gained 
in importance as a way to justify the oppression of women, for various reasons which go 
beyond the scope of this chapter. Over time, different anatomical or physiological  
measures of mental differences were tried (e.g., as part of craniology) and taken to con- 
firm what was so ‘evident’ to those men doing science at the time. Take Gustave LeBon 
(1881: 155-159), founding figure of social psychology and part of the craniologist move- 
ment. He famously speaks about the “intellectual inferiority” of women as “quite evident” 
(trop évidente). For him, women “represent the most inferior form of human evolution and 
are much closer to children and savages than to civilized adult man.” He added: 
 
It is beyond doubt that there are very distinguished women, far superior to 
the average men, but these are cases as exceptional as the birth of any mon- 
strosity, such as, for example, a gorilla with two heads, and therefore negli- 
gible entirely. (ibid.: 158, my translation)8 
 
In the 19th century, quite generally, the Aristotelian metaphysics of telos, form versus mat- 
ter, and ‘to-be-realizedness’ was gone and a materialist ontology dominated the study of 
human diversity. What remained is that a specific property was utilized to regard women 
as less human (intelligence), and—most importantly for this chapter—mind was either 
reduced to the brain or so linked with the brain that one could infer mental differences 
from differences in anatomical or physiological properties. That means that the crucial 
element of natural kind thinking, the belief in a hidden (rather than an observable) essen- 
tial property, plays either no role (in cases where mind was equated with brain), or at least 
a different role (in cases where the exact correspondence of differences in brain and mind 
was assumed). In both cases, women were clearly taken as already observably different in 
their humanity. 
 
That observable differences were gaining in significance over time is particularly 
interesting given an important earlier historical shift during the age of Columbus (see 
Kontler, this volume, for a general take on that time). The ‘Columbian shift’ (as I would 
like to call it) was one from expectations of ‘otherness’ that involved quite some observa- 
ble differences to actual encounters with Atlantic people, who looked (at the time, given 
historical evidence) shockingly similar. In medieval times, pictures of monstrous people 
circulated, often with reference to Plini the Elder (see Friedman 1981). These monstrous 
people, often called ‘Plinian races,’ had one eye only, faces on the thorax, heads of animals, 
etc. (see Figure 1). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8 The original says, “…représentent les formes les plus inférieures de l’évolution humaine et sont beauceup 
[sic!] plus près des enfants et des sauvages que de l’homme adulte civilisé.”(157); “On ne saurait nier, sans 
doute, qu'il existe des femmes fort distinguées, très-supérieures à la moyenne des hommes, mais ce sont là des 
cas aussi exceptionnels que la naissance d'une monstruosité quelconque, telle, par exemple, qu'un gorille à 
deux tètes, et par conséquent négligeables entièrement.” (158) 
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Figure 1 Plinian races in Sebastian Münster’s Cosmographia (1544: DCCLII). (Public domain) 
 
Distant people, believed to live at the edge of the perceiver’s world, were depicted that 
way. Friedman (1981: 25) explains the imaginative power of Plinian races as ethnocentric 
“errors in perception” that “were willful, poetic and imaginative.” Through actual encoun- 
ters with Atlantic people, their imaginative power changed to a considerable degree dur- 
ing the age of Columbus. As the historian Abulafia (2008: 4) reports, “experience” with 
Atlantic people “did not quite match the stories of dog-headed people found in medieval 
literature. They looked fully human.” The imaginary of monsters, as other historians have 
shown, clearly persisted in travelogues, maps, natural history, and elsewhere well into the 
18th century and beyond, and for various reasons (see Daston and Park 1997: 173-314, 
Krämer 2014, Davies 2017, Sebastiani forthc). But whenever the perception of significant 
similarity replaced the expectation that the encountered were physiologically extreme (i.e., 
monstrous), something had to step in to justify the dominion of those encountered. Not 
surprisingly, stories about these others as exhibiting different kinds of conduct (most 
prominently the cannibalism attributed to them) and assumptions about unobservable 
properties such as ‘not having a soul’ circulated, either replacing stories of physical mon- 
strosity or in parallel to them. They stepped in or were added, in order to have something 
sufficiently credible to justify the often pre-existing dehumanizing prejudice against those 
encountered. 
 
With this in mind, we can finally distinguish between four strategies that can facil- 
itate dehumanization, taking relational and non-relational dehumanization together. De- 
humanizing practices can point to 
• physiological or anatomical differences, 
• relational differences, 
• behavioral differences, or 
• unobservable differences. 
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These strategies can be (and have been) combined (and in various ways), but they can fall 
apart too. For instance, all four ways of combining physiological differences and mental 
differences can be observed in the history of thought (see Table 1). 
 
 
 Significant mental	differences No	significant mental differences 
Significant 1. A belief in significant physiolog- 2. A belief in significant physiolog- 
physiological	 ical or anatomical differences cor- ical or anatomical differences 
or anatomi- responding to significant mental without a belief in mental differ- 
cal differ- differences (e.g., Aristotle; Plinian ences (e.g., more or less conserva- 
ences races; 19th-century dehumanization tive theories of biological differ- 
 of women; contemporary cases of ences between sexes) 
 neurological reductionism of gen-  
 der differences)  
No	signifi- 3. A belief in physiological and 4. A belief that there are no signifi- 
cant physio- anatomical sameness combined cant differences what so ever (e.g.; 
logical or with a belief in significant mental more radical cases of contempo- 
anatomical differences (e.g., mentioned cases rary theories of sexual difference; 
difference of Atlantic encounter) contemporary non-racist theories) 
 
Table 1 Four different ways of establishing (non-)difference by combining physiological and mental differ- 
ences 
 
Only (3), the lower-left corner of the four-partite classification of cases, can exemplify 
Smith’s picture. The top-left and top-right corners (1 and 2) provide counterexamples 
since they do not involve regarding humans as observably the same but essentially different. 
The lower-right corner (4) does not involve any claims about significant differences and 
thus fails to exemplify dehumanization. 
 
For summary, I would like to highlight four points: First, cases of relational de- 
humanization and cases of dehumanization on the basis of claims about observable differ- 
ences show that not all cases of dehumanization involve an observation-based attribution of 
sameness and consequent cognitive discounting of essence. There are other ways, other forms, 
to arrive at a justification for dehumanizing attitudes. With respect to relational dehuman- 
ization, it needs to be mentioned that it is certainly possible (and maybe even likely) that 
historical cases of dehumanization that are at first glance based only on genealogical dis- 
tance ultimately turn out to also involve a belief in different essences. But it need not be so; 
it is equally possible that they do not. It is that second possibility which shows that a be- 
lief in a natural kind essence is not necessary for dehumanization to occur. 
 
Second, at the meta-level of writing the history of dehumanization, the following 
holds: as scholars studying cases of dehumanization, we do not need to and should not, at 
least not without necessity, assume an essentialist belief in the mind of the dehumanizer 
in order to make sense of a historical case. As a researcher, one always runs the risk of 
wrongly (i.e., anachronistically) attributing to historical actors an assumed timeless ontol- 
ogy of the human. With respect to essentialism, this is a danger in parts of the literature 
on dehumanization that stems, in my opinion, from the above-mentioned recent general 
debates on psychological essentialism, especially as these grew out of developmental psy- 
chology. These debates have a tendency to treat psychological essentialism itself (at the 
meta-level) as inherent and innate, and thus as a historically invariant and inalterable fea- 
ture of our cognition. This is a meta-essentialist move (essentialism about psychological 
essentialism, so to say) that lacks sufficient justification for the reasons mentioned in Sec- 
tions 3 and 4. 
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Third, the historical cases mentioned suffice to illustrate a pattern: when no ob- 
servable differences are available to establish a clear-cut difference justifying dehumaniza- 
tion, then reference to a difference in unobservable essence can still be used (as it hap- 
pened during the Columbian encounters); but when observable differences were available, 
these were used and the epistemic role of unobservable essences changed. This is how a 
dehumanizer can have it both ways: if one has observable differences, one can dehumanize 
people on the basis of these; if that ‘light solution’ does not suffice (for whatever reason), 
one can still invoke the ontologically more ‘heavy-metal’ machinery of unobservable nat- 
ural kind essences. As so often in history of science and philosophy, reference to non- 
observables helps as an epistemologically immunized step-in to justify believing or doing 
what one wants to believe or do anyway – in our case, to dehumanize certain people. For 
those cases where observable differences are available, reference to hidden essences can 
certainly still be used as a catalyzer to boost the dehumanization possible on the basis of 
observable differences alone. Yet, and that is the decisive point, reference to a difference in 
essence (or, if categorically minded, a different essence) is not necessary in such cases of 
dehumanization. 
 
Fourth, the above shows that in analyzing the history of dehumanization, a dis- 
tinction should be made between essentialism being necessary (by stepping in for missing 
observable differences) and essentialism being merely catalytic. This distinction helps to 
derive a revised version of the natural kind necessity-claim—a version that is more pre- 
cise, weaker but not too weak, and less conjectural in face of historical and contemporary 
evidence about dehumanization. In and of themselves, beliefs in hidden essences are not 
necessary for dehumanization; if at all, then they become necessary for dehumanization if 
and only if the search for (or assumption of) salient observable differences cannot be ‘cashed in’ in 
an intent to dehumanize. In such a case, reference to unobservables is a last-resort strategy 
for the dehumanizer. If everything fails, this is how the dehumanizer can do it: deny 
something unobservable! 
 
 
5 Is entitativity necessary? 
 
So far, we have only seen that natural kind thinking is not necessary for dehumanization 
to occur. When Leyens et al. claimed that essentialism is necessary for dehumanization, 
they obviously used a different, very broad sense of essentializing – namely, entitativity 
attributions. Is psychological essentialism, in the sense of assuming high entitativity of a 
group, necessary for dehumanization? 
 
It seems so, at least at first glance, since dehumanization often involves group ste- 
reotypes. Such stereotypes can lead to dehumanization, even if no natural kind thinking is 
involved. One can even hypothesize that the more informativeness there is in the concept 
of the human, the more potential there is to use it for dehumanization. A richer concept of 
the human makes dehumanization deeper. Sometimes the dehumanization of women is 
based on physiological differences only – for example, when the limitations regarding 
their social roles or rights are justified simply by reference to their biological ability to 
bear a child. Keeping them in their traditional and confined social roles is then justified by 
pointing to the fact that it makes it more likely that women actually use their unique bio- 
logical capacities. Yet, sometimes such a biologistic confinement strategy is combined 
with claims about mental differences regarding rationality and morality, further deepen- 
ing the dehumanization (see Tuana 1993 on this multi-dimensionality). The more proper- 
ties (linked to being human) involved, the richer the stereotype; the richer the stereotype, 
the harder the spell. 
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In the entitativity sense, the stereotype of ‘being human’ refers to what Kronfeld- 
ner (2018) calls a minimal descriptive concept of human nature: contingent generaliza- 
tions about humans at a certain time, without assuming a narrow-sense, ‘heavy-metal’ 
concept of a natural kind essence. Yet, reasoning with such contingent generalizations 
about humans still has dehumanizing potential since individuals who do not conform to 
the generalizations forming the stereotype can still be dehumanized. Any case of ableism 
or contemporary eugenics is a case in point for such non-natural-kind dehumanization 
(see Crary, this volume; see Wilson, this volume). Thus, dehumanization can and often 
will take place solely on the basis of a minimal concept of a descriptive nature – that is, on 
the basis of a stereotype of being human. 
 
Having that clarified, we can return to what is at issue here: whether dehumaniza- 
tion can happen even without such an already quite ‘minimal’ variation-discounting ste- 
reotype. There are at least two cases that show that it indeed can. There can be dehumani- 
zation without entitativity-based essentialism involved – that is, without any reference to 
a variation-discounting postulation of group homogeneity (stereotype). 
 
The first case continues the earlier discussion of the dehumanization of women. In 
Le Bon’s picture (see the quote discussed earlier) everything is graded, consistent with the 
spread of statistical thinking in the 19th century. In his view, it is a ‘large’ number of wom- 
en that are ‘closer’ to gorillas than to ‘most’ developed men. This, and in particular the 
additional claim that women that are evidently superior to the ‘average man’ are ‘excep- 
tional’ and therefore comparable to a monstrous being, is best interpreted as a case of sta- 
tistical dehumanization—a dehumanization based on partly overlapping so-called normal 
distributions (a.k.a. bell curves) (see Figure 2 for illustration). 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 A graphic representation of a statistical dehumanization of women modeled after LeBon’s account. 
The first bell curve represents the distribution of intelligence for apes, the second for women, and the third for 
men. The single cross sign represents the to-be-discounted ‘monster women’ in LeBon’s account. 
 
Such a statistical dehumanization allows for a few apes being more intelligent than some 
women and some women being more intelligent than some men, even though not more 
intelligent than the ‘average man.’ It is clear from the historical scholarship of 19th-century 
sciences that most of the thinking at the time was still typologist – that is, still discounting 
the observed variation and packaging things into (stereo-) types. In addition, normal dis- 
tributions are the result of idealizations, via curve fitting of the actual data obtained. As 
LeBon wrote and as represented in Figure 2, the “monstrous” women are still regarded as 
“negligible entirely”; they are crossed out of the generalizations. Both the discounting of 
variation and the curve fitting are not surprising. From a contemporary vantage point, the 
“problem of stereotypes is” precisely, as Tajfel (1969: 177), wrote “that of the relation be- 
tween a set of attributes which vary on continuous dimensions and classifications which 
are discontinuous.” 
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Yet, it still holds that there can be cases from the past (and the future) where de- 
humanization is based on statistical distributions with variation being fully acknowledged 
(i.e., statistical thinking showing up in full) and without dehumanization becoming im- 
possible. A variation-discounting entitativity essentialism is thus not necessary for dehu- 
manization to occur. 
 
As before, it is important to mention that such a statistical form of dehumanization 
can, and often will, connect to stereotyping and even to natural kind thinking, but it does 
not have to. One such way to connect statistical thinking to natural kind thinking has been 
entirely ignored in this paper: it might well be that the statistical distributions themselves, 
those grounding the dehumanization of women, are taken to be fixed and explainable as 
the result of heredity.9 Russett (1989), for instance, mentions this tendency toward heredi- 
tarian thinking in the case of 19th-century sexual science. Hence, beliefs in fixity of the sta- 
tistical distributions can connect to post-essentialist, variation-acknowledging styles of 
reasoning about the ‘other.’ But that alone does not make the dehumanizing beliefs about 
women essentialist, at least not with respect to the other elements of psychological essen- 
tialism. In addition, it does not make the beliefs in fixity necessary for dehumanization of 
(groups of) individuals. (For how fixity—i.e., beliefs in biological determinism, or general- 
ly, the naturalization of being human—connect to dehumanization of the human species 
as a whole, see Milam, this volume). 
 
The best case, though, that is available for showing that dehumanization does not 
necessarily involve entitativity claims stems from the data on what Haslam et al. (2005) 
call self-humanization (see also Demoulin et al., this volume) or from what is called the 
“lesser mind problem” (for review, see Waytz et al., 2014). Both are pointing to an indi- 
vidual-to-individual form of dehumanization since sometimes one attributes to other in- 
dividuals (or even to one’s own future self) lesser mind, with mind standardly taken to be 
realized as agency (cognitive abilities) or experience (emotional abilities). Since ‘mind 
means human’ in most contemporary ontologies of the human, ‘lesser mind’ means ‘lesser 
human’ (see also, Machery, this volume and Varga, this volume). While stereotypes can 
facilitate mind attribution, such attribution is not necessarily based on stereotypes. This is 
simply because the relationship between two human individuals is not necessarily based 
on stereotypes, nor is the relationship between me and my future self. A graded attribu- 
tion of a specific property (or set of properties) is all that is needed for attributing lesser 
mind. I thus take the literature on self-dehumanization and the ‘lesser mind’ problem to 
confirm that homogenized stereotypes can but do not have to be involved in these forms of 
dehumanization. 
 
 
6 Conclusion and outlook 
 
This chapter illustrates how one can dehumanize people without using essentialized 
thinking. Dehumanization most abstractly viewed is about navigating the responsiveness 
that we show to each other, either as individuals or as members of groups. Dehumaniza- 
tion is a pernicious and unfortunately quite easy-to-use cognitive tool. We use it to struc- 
ture the kinds of social interactions that result in discriminations, hierarchies, and exclu- 
sions. It is a cognitive mechanism for managing difference and similarity, closeness and 
distance. It is not necessarily one of discounting or negating variation so that distinct 
boundaries between groups can be utilized. Shades of being human are enough to dehu- 
manize. 
 
9 Thanks to Christina Brandt, who reminded me about this. 
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Furthermore, it is expectable that the next years of studying dehumanization will 
uncover even more complexity with respect to psychological essentialism and dehumani- 
zation. For instance, there are empirical hints that psychological essentialism can have 
positive effects in fighting discrimination and exclusion: Haslam et al. (2002) report, for 
instance, that in their studies “some anti-essentialist beliefs were associated with anti-gay 
attitudes,” meaning, in specific contexts and with respect to specific elements, it holds that 
essentialist beliefs can be less dehumanizing (compared to their anti-essentialist counter- 
part). This happens, for instance, when homosexuality is presented as given and fixed 
rather than chosen.10 This conundrum fits the back-and-forth in discussions about gender 
and essentialism, as part of which the postcolonial theorist Spivak (1988: 13) recommend- 
ed to use essentialism strategically, in the form of claims about shared properties. This 
utilizes the homogeneity element in order to improve the social, political, and material 
conditions of oppressed people.11 The direction of connecting essentialism and dehumani- 
zation matters too. Haslam et al. (2006: 68) show that some heterosexual men maintain an 
identity for themselves by utilizing distinctness beliefs, given their prejudice against ho- 
mosexual men. In such a case, the pre-existing dehumanizing prejudice would explain 
and catalyze essentialist thinking, rather than the other way around (this refers back to the 
limitation of the catalyzing claim mentioned in Section 1). If, as discussed in this chapter, 
the catalyzing works from essentialism to dehumanization, then the connection is condi- 
tional only: if no significant differences in observation (of behavior and body) are discern- 
ible, then essentialist thinking can still ground the dehumanization of (groups of) individ- 
uals. Essentialist thinking can involve homogenized group stereotypes, assumptions 
about heritage or other relational properties, or ontologically ‘heavier’ machinery, such as 
elements from natural kind thinking, in particular claims about hidden differences in un- 
observable properties inhering in individuals, such as ‘having a soul.’ But it does not have 
to. None of the elements of psychological essentialism is in and of itself necessary. 
 
Using hidden differences, I reckoned, has a special advantage for the dehumanizer 
and that elucidates, finally, how the catalyzing can work: beliefs in hidden essences are 
usually immune to revision in the face of stereotype-inconsistent information. Believing in 
unobservable essences is thus very likely a more ‘efficient’ and ‘secure’ way to uphold 
stereotypes (negative and positive ones). Elaborating on this special ‘power’ of non- 
observables in the context of dehumanization is something that remains to be done in the 
future. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10 See Haslam and Levy (2006), Rhodes et al. (2017, 2018), Agadullina and Lovakov (2018), and Ryazanov and 
Christenfeld (2018) for more from social psychology on the complexity with which psychological essentialism 
and prejudice generally connect. 
11 See, for a brief summary of the debate on strategic essentialism in gender and sexuality studies, Eide (2016); 
for a systematic take on the argumentative structure of anti-essentialism in feminist literature, see Witt (1995, 
2011) or Phillips (2010). 
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